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Abstract
The quantum mechanical wave-particle dualism is analyzed and criti-
cized, in the framework of Reichenbach’s concepts of phenomenon and in-
terphenomenon. It is suggested that the dual pictures be de-emphasized
in the study of quantum theory. In this connection a view of the elec-
tron and other such particles as having discontinuous spatiality in time is
presented and discussed.
1 INTRODUCTION
Textbooks on quantummechanics typically begin by discussing the wave-particle
dualism in its extreme aspects: such processes are best described in the particle
picture, such other in the wave picture. Some texts, like Schiff’s [1], for exam-
ple, do then present a strictly correct, but too succinct “quantum mechanical
viewpoint.” After this the mathematical formalism is developed, and only oc-
casionally the qualitative aspects of the theory are touched upon. It is left to
the student the not-so-easy task of integrating the qualitative and quantitative
fundamentals of quantum theory into a logically coherent, visualizable picture
of the atomic world.
In the present paper I first make an analysis and criticism of the concept of
dualism. Our purpose is to sharply expose the artificiality and non-uniqueness
of both the wave and the particle pictures. To our knowledge the best analysis
of the quantum mechanical dualism is that of H. Reichenbach, in his book
Philosophic Foundations of Quantum Mechanics [2]. I am therefore guided by
Reichenbach’s ideas in our study of the meaning of the wave-particle dualism.
Second, and more important, a qualitative picture of microscopic reality is
advocated, which is consistent with the more abstract interpretation of quantum
mechanics. As is well known, this interpretation assigns physical reality to ob-
servable facts only. The key to our preferred language is to abandon thinking of
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micro-objects – I shall deal with electrons for definiteness – as having permanent
spatiality; that is, as having spatial properties at all times. For instance, the
question “Where is the electron when it is not observable?” is meaningless, since
the electron by definition does not have a place when it does not participate in
an observable phenomenon. This meaninglessness is not a mere consequence of
unobservability. It is rather a matter of adequate definition.
In Section 2 Reichenbach’s ideas of phenomenon and interphenomenon are
introduced, as a basis for the discussion of the wave-particle dualism. In Sec.
3 an alternative language is presented, which pre-empties micro-objects such as
electrons or photons of classical-like spatial attributes, such as temporal conti-
nuity of position or shape, trajectory, or propagation. I try to make it clear that
there is no real need for such attributes in micro-objects. Next (Sec. 4) both
viewpoints - i.e., those of Sections 2 and 3 - are applied to a physical example.
I call the reader’s attention to the fact that physics progresses by increasing
degrees of abstraction. Concluding remarks are made in the last Section.
2 REICHENBACH’S CONCEPTS OF PHE-
NOMENON AND INTERPHENOMENON
Reichenbach (p. 21 of [2]) defines phenomena as “occurrences which are so easily
inferable from macroscopic data that they may be considered observable in a
wider sense.”1 In the same page he rightly points out that the phenomena are
... determinate in the same sense as the unobserved objects of classical physics.
As a matter of fact, physicists are not troubled by the question of the reality of
observable-but-unobserved events, no more than by the question of the reality
of unobserved trees. As R. P. Feynman puts it: “Nature does not know what
you are looking at, and she behaves the way she is going to behave whether
you bother to take down the data or not.”[3] In other words, the concept of
phenomenon supposes “Berkeley’s problem” solved. A satisfactory solution is
given by A. J. Ayer [4].
Interphenomena are “occurrences ... constructed in the form of an interpola-
tion within the world of phenomena” (p. 21 of [2]). They are logical constructs
similar to phenomena, usable to fill the gaps in the world of phenomena, so that
the whole have an appearance of continuity in time. Notice that this is a purely
mental process! It is precisely this process that I intend to dispose of, as will be
seen below.
Next, Reichenbach says that “the distinction betIen phenomena and inter-
phenomena is the quantum mechanical analogue of the distinction between ob-
served and unobserved things” (p. 21 of [2]). This analogy is somewhat mis-
leading, because the relation between phenomena and interphenomena is not
so simple as that between observed and unobserved macro-objects. If one likes
1I should perhaps add that a phenomenon leaves some trace of its occurrence, which remains
for some time, so that it can in every case be detected (at least conceivably; see [4]).
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labels, we might call the question of interphenomena “Berkeley’s problem of
the second degree”: formerly one had to construct objects out of actual or ex-
pected sense-experiences; here one has to define entities related to experience
only through its end points, the initial and final events.
After these preliminaries, it may be said that the particle and wave pictures
in quantum theory represent different choices of interphenomena. In the former,
the gap between, say, two consecutive electron appearances (two “happenings,”
or phenomena, involving the electron) is filled by an imagined trajectory (in-
terphenomena!) traveled by the electron, imagined as a point-like object. With
wave-like interphenomena, on the other hand, the same gap if filled by imagining
the first phenomenon as a disturbance in a medium, then a wave-like propaga-
tion of the disturbance, and finally a quick coalescing of the wave into another
point-like disturbance.
3 THE IDEA OF DISCONTINUOUS SPATIAL-
ITY
The considerations of the preceding Section will be illustrated by an example
in the next Section. Here the dualistic view is countered with what I consider
a more rational and satisfactory picture.2
The point is this: there is no need for interphenomena. Beween two con-
secutive, observable events nothing happens to the electron. During this time
interval the electron is nowhere, it is out of space. One is not allowed to say
that it has as “indefinite position” somewhere in the neighborhood of the events.
Contrarily to the situation with macroscopic things, micro-objects like electrons
do not constantly occupy a place, they have a place only when they appear.
Electrons have a permanent potentiality to interact, mathematically expressed
as its charge, and hence to appear in space, but no permanent spatiality. (This
is a qualitative content of the well known assertion that the state function ψ
gives a probability amplitude, not a wave amplitude. See also Section IV.3 in
[6].) In other words, its spatiality is limited, or discontinuous in time.I hope to
make this point clearer in next Section.
One might object that this picture has the disadvantage of being more ab-
stract than the dual pictures. My answer to this is: (1) “abstract” is a relative
term: a moment’s reflection may convince the reader that the classical concept
of trajectory is also quite abstract, though less so than quantum mechanical
concepts; and (2) progress in physics is often reached by increasing degrees of
abstraction, as for example the abandonment of a material ether as the medium
of electromagnetic waves. This is only natural, since “concrete” ideas are just
those of our too limited, ordinary sense experience.
2After completion of this work, my attention has been called to a possible relation between
the idea presented here and Margenau’s concept of “latent observable.” See Sec. 8.2 in [5].
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4 DIFFRACTION OF AN ELECTRON
Let us now illustrate the problem through an idealized3 experiment of diffraction
of an electron by a slit in a diaphragm [2].
diaphragm
S
screen
B
source
A
Figure 1: Schematic view of electron diffraction
Figure 1 is a sketch of the experimental situation: A is the electron source, S
is the slit in the diaphragm, and B is the point on the screen where the electron is
absorbed. The source is supposed to be so weak that only one electron is emitted
at a time. The emission of an electron at A and its absorption at B are point-
like events, and are phenomena in the sense defined above. Let us call them
process α and process β, respectively. The space and time gap between these
phenomena has been filled by Reichenbach with particle-like interphenomena
and with wave-like interphenomena, which I shall now discuss. Note that these
constructs are not incorrect. They are logically sound, indeed. The point to be
emphasized in this paper is rather their artificiality. My claim is that it is more
illuminating4 to discard interphenomena altogether, and to consider quantum
mechanical objects as entities which do not always occupy space.
4.1 Particle-like interphenomena
In this picture the electron is said to be a concentrated lump of matter, which
after process α at A travels through space along a straight path from A to
3In practice electron diffraction is obtained by the passage of an electron beam through a
crystal.
4Despite Reichenbach’s naming of the abstract views as “restrictive interpretations” (p. 33
of [2]).
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S. Then it proceeds along another straight line from S to B, where process β
occurs.
This is called a normal interpretation, which is another important concept
in Reichenbach’s analysis: it means that the constructed interphenomena obey
physical laws which do not sharply differ from the laws of the observed world of
phenomena [2]. (Otherwise it is called an anomalous interpretation. See below.)
Note that here the direction the electron will take after passing S can only be
predicted in probability terms: this does not make the interphenomena anoma-
lous, since analogous situations exist in the world of phenomena - for example,
quantum phenomena too can only be predicted in probability terms.
4.2 Wave-like interphenomena
This picture is less trivial, and more relevant to the present discussion. We
say that the electron is a wave-like disturbance of a medium, initiated by phe-
nomenon α at A This is not an anomaly: the medium has been invented for
the support of interphenomena, but its ability to oscillate is normal. Later the
wave collapses in order to wholly pass through slit S, which is an anomaly: no
such instantaneous collapse exists for real waves. Then the wave propagates
from S to the screen, and finally collapses again at B for the production of
phenomenon β. So the wave-like interpretation is anomalous. But this does not
make it wrong. In Reichenbach’s theory, it is as true as the particle-like picture.
Such anomalies are the price one pays for demanding “filling the gaps” between
real events.
4.3 The abstract picture
This picture says that between phenomena α and β nothing happens to the
electron. Needless to say, it has been assumed all along that there is vacuum
between the elements sketched in the figure. The ψ-function and the rules of
quantum theory let us calculate the probability of event β after α has happened,
but no spatial picture of inter-events is allowed. The electron has position A
when α occurs and position B when β occurs. In between it does not have
either place or shape, it has no spatiality.
4.4 Exercise
It is left as an exercise for the reader to make similar discussion for what is known
in quantum mechanics as tunneling through a potential barrier [1]. Especially
noteworthy is the fact that its particle-like interphenomena have the anomaly
of energy non-conservation [2].
5 CONCLUSION
Reichenbach’s analysis of the wave-particle dualism of quantum mechanics has
the great merit of showing that these interpretations are logical constructs,
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neither unique nor unambiguous for a given physical situation. While in a lower
level - i. e., in the case of unobserved facts or objects - similar constructs
are very convenient and adequate, because unambiguous and “normal,” they
are rather restrictive of the imagination in the case of inter-events. I think it
is more illuminating to discard the concept of dualism, and to recognize that
there is no need to project all ideas of physical theory into space. Space, or more
precisely position in space, is in a sense produced by physical phenomena. The
macrophysical, persistent continuity of spatial forms is an illusion analogous
to many others, for example, the illusion of spatial continuity of macroscopic
matter. The proper language of physics is mathematical, and in many cases
mathematical statements do not allow for mapping on intuitive space. Thus an
electron is a linguistic entity logically similar to common sense objects [4], but
having a much poorer spatial character.5
Of course, the language of the wave and particle pictures has heuristic value
in problem solving and experiment setting. It is also a practical jargon. We may
even say that these pictures have some reality. However, the actual measure-
ments and calculations are expressed in mathematical language, and physicists
move so safely in this domain that they may not see how vague are qualitative
statements made in terms of the dual pictures.
I cannot propose that the idea of dualism be banned from physics. But I
do suggest that students pay more attention to the unrealism of considering
an electron as “sometimes a particle and sometimes a wave.” The electron is
a mathematically defined thing, which has the physical attributes of form and
position only intermittently: namely, when it participates in the production of
a phenomenon.
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